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Abstract 
The  Uruguay  Round  of negotiations  under  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  may  draw  agriculture  into  an  unprecedented 
global  liberalization process.  If developed  nations  write  the  agenda  for 
these negotiations  and  direct  the  research  on  economic  effects  of 
liberalization,  they  are  likely  to  underplay  several  impacts  which  fall 
primarily  on  LDC's. 
This  paper  identifies  several  ways  in  which  the history,  structure, 
or  economic  power  of LDC's  precipitate different  consequences  from 
liberalization  than  would  arise  in developed nations.  These  points  ought 
to be  recognized  at  the  GATT  both because  the  negotiations will  affect 
their resolution  and  because  they will affect  the  coalitions  and 
compromises  LDC's  bring  to  the  GATT. DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  AGRICULTURE  IN  THE  URUGUAY  ROUND: 
WHAT  THE  NORTH  MIGHT  MISS 
The  Uruguay  Round  of negotiations  under  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  (GATT)  may  draw  agriculture  into  an  unprecedented  global 
liberalization process.  The  impetus  for  liberalizing agriculture  comes 
primarily  from  the  developed  nations  that have  incurred  substantial budgetary 
costs  and  accumulated  commodity  stocks  as  a  result of government  farm 
programs.  These  problems,  however,  are not  prevalent  in developing  nations 
(LDC's),  so  other  issues  must  dominate  the  analysis  of  their  interests  in 
agricultural  policy reform  through  the  GATT.  The  importance  of agriculture 
within  the  economies  of LDC's,  the  importance  of some  LDC's  as  competitors  of 
the  developed  nations,  and  the  importance  of many  LDC's  as  consumers  in  the 
world  agricultural markets  all argue  for  active  participation by  LDC's  in 
determining  the  outcome  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  Liberalization,  in  the  context 
of  the  negotiations, refers  to  the  removal  of all  import barriers, export 
subsidies,  and  domestic  agricultural  programs  that  support  producer  revenues. 
This  paper  presents  a  list of issues  that might  motivate  a  strengthening 
of  the  currently  limited role  of  LDC's  in directing global agricultural  policy 
reform.  The  issues  discussed here  do  not directly affect  developed  countries 
and,  consequently,  they  are  less  likely  to  be  central  to  the  negotiating 
proposals  formulated  by  the  developed  countries.  These  issues  are,  however, 
significant  to  developed  countries  both  for  their  implications  about 
relationships  with  LDC's  and  for  their  contribution  to  garnering  support  for 
the  agricultural policy  reform  process.  The  identification of  these  issues 
could  contribute  to  the  definition of  a  limited  set of exemptions  from 
liberalization for  LDC's.  Developed  countries  have  already begun  to  identify exceptions  to  trade  liberalization,  such  as  "decoupled"  farm  income  payments, 
that  serve  their  interests  (U.S.  Negotiating  Group  on Agriculture,  1987). 
The  list presented here  is part of a  longer  list of issues  related  to 
agricultural policy reform  that  concerns  countries at all levels of 
development.  All  countries  are  interested  in  the effects of liberalization on 
farm  income,  food  costs,  food  security,  government  revenue,  and  net  foreign 
exchange  earnings.  Nearly all governments  are  susceptible  to  conflicts 
between  large  and  small  farmers,  rural  and  urban  groupings,  importers  and 
exporters,  and  numerous  other  classes differentially affected  by agricultural 
policy. 
Furthermore,  although  the  issues  discussed  here  pertain directly  to LDC's, 
each  does  not  necessarily  pertain  to all LDC's.  LDC's  are  distinguished  from 
developed  countries  by  characteristics  like  lower  per  capita  income  and 
industrialization, but  they  compose  an  extremely heterogeneous  group  of other 
characteristics.  It is  unlikely  that  an  exception  to  liberalization based, 
for  example,  on  ~ncome level  could  be  defined  that would  be  either appropriate 
for  or  accepted  by  all LDC's.  Some  LDC's  even  are  likely  to resist exceptions 
for  others because  LDC's  are  growth  markets  for  each  other  as  well  as  for 
developed  countries.  Thus  the  issues  presented here  could  lead  to  a  limited 
set  of  exceptions  extended  only  to  those  LDC's  having  specified 
characteristics. 
Agriculture  as  an  Infant  Industry 
A  familiar  justification for  some  form  of government  intervention  is based 
on  the  argument  that  a  new  industry requires  time  to  develop  to  a  competitive 
2 level  and  that  the  long  term benefits  of protection  exceed  the  short  run  costs 
(Johnson,  1981).  GATT  signatories  have  already accepted  infant  industry 
development  as  one  of  two  bases  (along with  payment  imbalances)  for  different 
and  more  favorable  treatment  of LDC's  (Hindley,  1987). 
A similar  logic  defends  government  intervention  in LDC  agriculture where 
technological  and  infrastructural  development  are  needed  or  underway,  and  are 
often  far  behind  levels  encountered  in developed  countries.  Development 
assistance,  producer  subsidies  that  are  designed  to help  farmers  adopt  new 
technology  and  become  better  integrated  into  the marketing  system,  and 
temporary  trade barriers  can shift  the  current structure of  comparative 
advantage  in  favor  of LDC's  and  can  contribute  to  a  global  improvement  in 
efficiency  for  agricultural  production.  The  current  competitive  advantage  of 
some  developed  countries  in agriculture  is rooted  not  only  in  favorable 
resource  endowments  but  also  in  decades  of  government  assistance  to 
agriculture  that has  facilitated market  development  and  technological  change. 
Investment  in  technology  and  the  public  goods  of  infrastructure  for  LDC 
agriculture also  require  a  long  term  commitment  that  can  come  only  from 
government. 
Reduction  ~n Food  Aid  Supply 
Current  GATT  proposals  for  agricultural  policy  reform  exempt  bona  fide 
food  assistance  programs  (U.S.  Negotiating Group  on Agriculture,  1987),  but  a 
major  incentive  for  food  aid  supply  is  the  presence  of  surplus  in  donor 
nations  (Hopkins,  1984;  International  Trade  and  Development  Education 
Foundation,  1985;  Wallerstein,  1980).  If the  GATT  achieves  its goal  of 
3 reducing  food  surpluses  in developed  nations,  the quantity of  food  aid  is 
likely  to  fall.  If  less  food  aid  is  forthcoming,  alternative  sources  of  food 
and  storage will be  needed  by  countries  dependent  on  food  aid.  For  example, 
unusually high  commercial  sales  reduced  food  surpluses  and  food  aid  in  1974 
contributing  to  famine  in Africa  and  South Asia. 
Additionally,  sales  of  food  aid  in LOC's  will no  longer be  a  source  of 
revenues  used  for  development  purposes.  Although  food  aid has  had  negative 
consequences  in  some  recipient countries  where  its availability has  been  a 
disincentive  to domestic  production  and  has  heightened  dependence  on  foreign 
suppliers  (Helm,  1979;  Wallerstein,  1980),  food  aid recipients  may  have  an 
incentive  to block  the  efforts  to reduce  surpluses  unless  some  alternative 
mechanism  for  food  security  and  development  assistance  is  linked  to  the  GATT 
actions. 
Vulnerability  to  World  Market  Fluctuation 
Export  price  and  revenue variability present  a  national  problem  to 
countries  which  depend  on  one  or  only  a  few  commodities  for  export  earnings. 
These  countries  are  nearly all LOC's.  In general,  existing  forms  of 
agricultural protectionism raise  the variability of international prices  by 
transfering domestic  price  instability to world  markets  and  global  trade 
liberalization would  tend  to stabilize international  prices  (Tyers  and 
Anderson,  1987;  World  Bank,  1987).  Increased world  price stability has  been 
used  as  an  argument  in  favor  of LOC  support  for  global  liberalization  (Nogues, 
1985).  However,  liberalization does  not  necessarily  lead  to more  stable 
export  earnings  as  export  volumes  could  become  less  stable  in  the  absence  of 
4 government  intervention.  Additionally,  certain policies  can  stabilize 
domestic  prices,  so  political pressures  for  greater price stability are  not 
exclusively directed  toward  global  liberalization.  LDC's  have  sought  improved 
stability through  regional  free  trade organization.  Such  integration efforts 
can  reduce  price variation although  the gains  are  less  than  those  from  global 
liberalization (Koester,  1984). 
Sudan  provides  a  dramatic  example  of overdependence  on  a  single 
international market.  In  the  famine  year  of  1983,  Sudanese  cotton production 
was  at  its highest  level  since  the  1975  drought but  international prices  fell 
to  the  lowest  level  since  1976.  The  1983  wholesale  price was  only  53  percent 
of  the  1981  price.  Even  with  these  low  prices,  cotton  provided half of 
Sudan's  export  value  in  1983  and  1984  (International Monetary  Fund,  1986).  If 
the  1983  crop  had  sold at  the  average  price  for  the  preceeding  three  years, 
twice  the  value  of u.S.  food  aid  received  that year  could have  been  purchased 
on  commercial  terms  (Economic  Research  Service,  1984). 
Shortage  of  Revenue  Sources 
Some  LDC's  are motivated  to  tax agricultural  imports  and  exports  partly 
because  there  are  insufficient alternative  sources  of  government  revenue.  For 
example,  in Argentina--where  agriculture  accounts  for  80  percent  of  foreign 
exchange  earnings--agricultural export  taxes  accounted,  until recently,  for  15 
percent  of central  government  revenues  (Economic  Research  Service,  1987).  A 
weak  state  and  a  paucity of  sectors  that  generate  surplus  value  combine  to 
limit  the  institutional structures  capable  of providing state revenue. 
International  trade  is  relatively easy  to  tax because  it generally  passes 
5 through  a  port  where  it can  be monitored.  The  collection process  is 
facilitated  where  few  commodities  are  traded  internationally or  there  are  few 
ports,  characteristics  common  in LDC's.  Trade  liberalization in countries 
that  rely  on  taxation of  trade  for  government  revenue  must  be  associated with 
finding  new  revenue  sources  or  dramatic  reduction  in government  costs. 
Shortage  of  revenue  in LDC's  may  also  make  it largely  infeasible  for  these 
countries  to  finance  'decoupled'  farm  income  payments,  the  support  mechanism 
favored  by  the  United  States  (U.S.  Negotiating Group  on Agriculture,  1987). 
Likewise,  there  may  well  be  a  lack of institutional structure  necessary  for 
the  distribution  and  monitoring of  such  income  payments. 
Responsiveness  to International Lending  Agencies 
LDC's  are  the  countries most  responsive  to  international  lending  agencies 
such  as  the  International Monetary  Fund,  the  World  Bank,  and  the bilateral 
lenders.  Reasons  for  their  responsiveness  include  heavy  debt  burdens  and 
shortage  of capital. 
Apart  from  the efforts at multilateral  trade  liberalization through  the 
GATT,  numerous  LDC's  have  responded  to  conditional  lending  agreements  with 
unilateral  liberalization.  This  trend  is  conspicuous  in  Sub-Saharan Africa 
where  22  of 45  countries were  undertaking  structural adjustment  in  1987  and 
several  others  have  recently devalued  their  currency  and  privatized 
parastatals  (Mabbs-Zeno,  1987).  The  general  trend  in Latin American  countries 
is  also  toward  reduced  government  intervention  in agriculture. 
6 The  trend  toward  unilateral  liberalization by LDC's  ra1ses  questions  about 
their participation in  a  multilateral liberalization effort.  In  theory, 
multilateral  liberalization would  involve  lower  adjustment  costs  and  greater 
welfare  gains  than  unilateral  liberalization.  In  the  meantime,  LDC's  may  be 
giving  away  their  GATT  'bargaining chips'  in  these  other negotiating  forums, 
leaving  them little influence  on  the  outcome  of  the  GATT  agricultural 
negotiations. 
Dualistic Agriculture 
Many  LDC~s have  a  dualistic agriculture with  a  commercial,  generally 
export-oriented,  sector  and  a  subsistence  production sector.  This  dualism 
represents  an  income  disparity  and  technology  gap  far  more  severe  and  deeply 
entrenched  than  any  typically encountered  in developed  countries  and  it 
introduces  qualitative differences  in  the  domestic  incentives  for  and  the 
effects  of  trade  liberalization. 
In  South Africa,  for  example,  corn  is  produced  by relatively  few 
commercially oriented  farmers  using  relatively high  levels  of  technology  and 
by  a  large  number  of subsistence  farmers.  The  commercial  farmers  were 
subsidized  through  marketing  board  pricing policies,  cheap  inputs  and  other 
measures  averaging  636  million rand  per  year  between  1982-86.  Reducing 
subsidies  to  these  commercial  growers  would  make  the  low-technology  producers 
more  competitive  in domestic  markets.  Thus  smaller  subsidies  could  have 
benefits  for  the majority of  farmers  in  that dualistic agriculture. 
7 Agricultural Taxation 
Although  many  countries  have  programs  which  tax agriculture,  only  LDC's 
fully offset  subsidy  programs  to yield net  taxation of production  of  an 
agricultural  commodity.  Liberalization of  programs  that  tax agriculture  tends 
to  raise  production,  an effect opposing  one  of  the  central  goals  of  the 
Uruguay  Round.  The  proposals  to  the  GATT  from  the  United  States,  the  EC,  the 
Cairns  Group  and  the  Nordic  countries  refer  to  reductions  in "subsidies  that 
distort  trade"  but  remain  silent on  the  issue  of  reducing  taxation measures 
that also  "distort trade."  Exporting nations  generally benefit  from  taxation 
of  producers  in competitor nations,  so  the  silence  in initial liberalization 
proposals  may  foreshadow  a  relaxation of global  liberalization goals  in  favor 
of  institutionalized differences  generally disfavoring  LDC  producers. 
U.S.  Department of Agriculture  research  on  government  intervention  in 
agriculture  found  three  LDC's  (of six cases  examined)  were  net  taxers  of wheat 
~n  1982-86,  three  (of six)  taxed  rice,  two  (of  four)  taxed  soybeans,  four  (of 
five)  taxed  cotton,  and  two  (of  two)  taxed  sugar  (table  1).  All  of  the  18 
instances  of net  commodity  taxation were  in LDC's  although  84 
country/commodity  combinations  were  examined  for  developed  countries.  As 
table  2  shows,  some  LDC  policies  also assisted  producers  positively --
principally with  farm  input  subsidies.  However,  the  current  language  of  the 
negotiating  proposals  suggests  that  these  countries  would  be  asked  to 
eliminate  positive  production  incentives  with  no  corresponding elimination of 
negative  incentives  (U.S.  Negotiating Group  on Agriculture,  1987;  Cairns  Group 
Proposal,  1987).  The  effect of  such  an  approach  could be 
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9 Table  2--Annual  Average  Value  of Transfers  to Producers 
by  Type  of Policy,  1982-86  1/ 
Per  capita  Exchange 
GDP  2/  Overall  Input  Output  rate  Total 
Country  ( 1985)  PSE  policies  policies  policies  trans fers 
Dollars  Percent  -------------Million dollars-----------
Taiwan  3,097  3/  19  99  841  NM  940 
South Korea  2,150  60  1193  3,690  NM  4,883 
Argentina  2,130  -19  0  -1163  646  -517 
Mexico  4/  2,080  41  646  375  369  1,390 
South Africa  2,010  29  349  861  160  1,370 
Brazil  1,640  4  2,132  -64  -394  1,674 
Thailand  800  1  69  -42  NM  26 
Nigeria  800  -41  62  17  -804  -725 
Indonesia  530  14  594  -366  NM  960 
Pakistan  380  -20  77  -289  NM  -212 
Sudan 5/  300  -11  1  34  -70  -35 
India  270  -18  974  -5,190  NM  -4,216 
NM  =  Not  measured.  1/  Commodity  coverage  varies by  country.  2/  Source:  World 
Bank.  3/  Source:  Inte;national Monetary  Fund.  4/  1982-85  5/  1982-84. 
Source:  ERS  1988 
to  increase  rather  than  reduce  distortions  ~n LDC  trade  and  would  clearly be 
biased  against  LDC  agricultural  interests.  u.S.  agricultural  trade 
negotiators  have  objected,  however,  to export  taxes  on  primary  agricultural 
products,  such  as  those  imposed  by Argentina  and  Brazil on  soybean  exports, 
where  the  effect of  the  tax is  to  subsidize exports  of  the  processed 
agricultural products  (the  soybean  products)  (Buenos  Aires  Herald,  Sept.  26, 
1987) • 
10 History of Special  and  Differential Treatment 
LDC's  have  been  insulated  from  past  liberalization efforts by  special  and 
differential  treatment  in  the  GATT.  Special  and  differential  treatment 
implies  that  LDC's  need  not  offer market  access  in  exchange  for  the  trade 
concessions  made  by  the  developed  countries.  This  precedent  appears  to have 
contributed  to  the  fact  that  industrial sector protection is, on  the  average, 
much  higher  in LDC's  than  in developing  countries.  Relatively high  levels  of 
protection  for  the manufacturing  sector  in  countries  such  as  Mexico,  Brazil, 
Chile,  Colombia  and  Argentina have  turned  the  internal  terms  of trade  against 
agriculture  and  contributed  to agricultural decline  (Valdez,  1986).  For 
example,  Krissoff  and  Ballenger  (1987)  found  that  Brazilian agricultural 
exports  would  have  been  13  percent higher  in  1984  if agricultural  policy had 
been  liberalized  and  16  percent higher  if manufacturing  sector  trade barriers 
had  also been  liberalized.  Although  protection of manufacturing  has  also 
tended  to decline  in LDC's  recently due  to  pressures  for  policy reform  and 
structural  adjustment,  the  liberalization of agriculture  in LDC's  may  occur 
against  a  very different macroeconomic  backdrop  than it would  in developed 
countries. 
Conclusion 
Some  LDC's  share  many  of  the  concerns  of developed  nations  that motivate 
the  present  attempt  at  the  GATT  to reduce  certain government  interventions  in 
agriculture.  If developed  nations  write  the  agenda  for  the  GATT  negotiations 
and  direct  the  research  on  econom~c effects  of  liberalization, however,  they 
are  likely  to  underplay  several  impacts  which  fall  primarily on 
11 LDC's.  Already  the  economic  debate  over  the effect of proposals  at  the  GATT 
is  dominated  by  models  that  say little about  the  issues  listed in  this  paper 
despite  the  importance  of  these  issues  in  the  examples  cited above.  Famine  in 
Sudan,  income  distribution in  South Africa,  government  revenue  in Argentina, 
and  the  negotiating  power  of debt-ridden nations  are  among  the  problems  which 
ought  to be  recognized at  the  GATT  both because  trade negotiations will affect 
their resolution,  and  because  they will affect  the  coalitions  and  compromises 
LOG's  bring  to  the  GATT. 
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